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| The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Univ
The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Univ
Truth Journal
The Existence of God and the
Beginning of the Universe
William Lane Craig
William Craig earned a doctorate in philosophy at the
University of Birmingham, England, before taking a doctorate in theology from
the Ludwig Maximiliens Universitat-Munchen, West Germany, at which latter
institution he was for two years a Fellow of the Alexander von
Humboldt-Stiftung. He is currently a visiting scholar at the Universite
Catholique de Louvain. He has authored various books, including The Kalam
Cosmological Argument, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz, and The
Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez,
as well as articles in professional journals like British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, Zeitschrift fur Philosophische Forschung, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, and Philosophia.
Introduction
"The first question which should rightly be asked," wrote
G.W.F. Leibniz, is "Why is there something rather than nothing?"[1] This
question does seem to possess a profound existential force, which has been felt
by some of mankind`s greatest thinkers. According to Aristotle, philosophy
begins with a sense of wonder about the world, and the most profound question a
man can ask concerns the origin of the universe.[2] In his biography of Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm reports that Wittgenstein said that he sometimes
had a certain experience which could best be described by saying that "when I
have it, I wonder at the existence of the world. I am then inclined to use such
phrases as `How extraordinary that anything should exist!`"[3] Similarly, one
contemporary philosopher remarks, ". . . My mind often seems to reel under the
immense significance this question has for me. That anything exists at all does
seem to me a matter for the deepest awe."[4] Why does something exist instead of
nothing? Leibniz answered this question by arguing that something exists rather
than nothing because a necessary being exists which carries within itself its
reason for existence and is the sufficient reason for the existence of all
contingent being.[5] Although Leibniz (followed by certain contemporary
philosophers) regarded the non- existence of a necessary being as logically
impossible, a more modest explication of necessity of existence in terms of what
he calls "factual necessity" has been given by John Hick: a necessary being is
an eternal, uncaused, indestructible, and incorruptible being.[6] Leibniz, of
course, identified the necessary being as God. His critics, however, disputed
this identification, contending that the material universe could itself be
assigned the status of a necessary being. "Why," queried David Hume, "may not
the material universe be the necessary existent Being, according to this
pretended explanation of necessity?"[7] Typically, this has been precisely the
position of the atheist. Atheists have not felt compelled to embrace the view
that the universe came into being out of nothing for no reason at all; rather
they regard the universe itself as a sort of factually necessary being: the
universe is eternal, uncaused, indestructible, and incorruptible. As Russell
neatly put it, " . . . The universe is just there, and that`s
all."[8]
Does Leibniz`s argument therefore leave us in a rational
impasse, or might there not be some further resources available for
untangling
the riddle of the existence of the world? It seems to me
that there are. It will be remembered that an essential property of a necessary
being is eternality. If then it could be made plausible that the universe began
to exist and is not therefore eternal, one would to that extent at least have
shown the superiority of theism as a rational world view.
Now there is one form of the cosmological argument, much
neglected today but of great historical importance, that aims precisely at the
demonstration that the universe had a beginning in time.[9] Originating in the
efforts of Christian theologians to refute the Greek doctrine of the eternity of
matter, this argument was developed into sophisticated formulations by medieval
Islamic and Jewish theologians, who in turn passed it back to the Latin West.
The argument thus has a broad inter- sectarian appeal, having been defended by
Muslims, Jews, and Christians both Catholic and Protestant.
This argument, which I have called the kalam cosmological
argument, can be exhibited as follows:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual
infinite.
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual
infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events
cannot exist.
2.2 Argument based on the impossibility of the formation
of an actual infinite by successive addition.
2.21 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be
actually infinite.
2.22 The temporal series of past events is a collection
formed by successive addition.
2.23 Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot
be actually infinite.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
Let us examine this argument more closely. Defense of the
Kalam Cosmological Argument Second Premiss Clearly, the crucial premiss in this
argument is (2), and two independent arguments are offered in support of it. Let
us therefore turn first to an examination of the supporting arguments. First
Supporting Argument In order to understand (2.1), we need to understand the
difference between a potential infinite and an actual infinite. Crudely put, a
potential infinite is a collection which is increasing toward infinity as a
limit, but never gets there. Such a collection is really indefinite, not
infinite. The sign of this sort of infinity, which is used in calculus, is . An
actual infinite is a collection in which the number of members really is
infinite. The collection is not growing toward infinity; it is infinite, it is
"complete." The sign of this sort of infinity, which is used in set theory to
designate sets which have an infinite number of members, such as {1, 2, 3, . .
.}, is 0. Now (2.11) maintains, not that a potentially infinite number of things
cannot exist, but that an actually infinite number of things cannot exist. For
if an actually infinite number of things could exist, this would spawn all sorts
of absurdities.
Perhaps the best way to bring home the truth of (2.11) is by
means of an illustration. Let me use one of my favorites, Hilbert`s Hotel, a
product of the mind of the great German mathematician, David Hilbert. Let us
imagine a hotel with a finite number of rooms. Suppose, furthermore, that all
the rooms are full. When a new guest arrives asking for a room, the proprietor
apologizes, "Sorry, all the rooms are full." But now let us imagine a hotel with
an infinite number of rooms and suppose once more that all the rooms are full.
There is not a single vacant room throughout the entire infinite hotel. Now
suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room. "But of course!" says the
proprietor, and he immediately shifts the person in room #1 into room #2, the
person in room #2 into room #3, the person in room #3 into room #4 and so on,
out to infinity. As a result of these room changes, room #1 now becomes vacant
and the new guest gratefully checks in. But remember, before he arrived, all the
rooms were full! Equally curious, according to the mathematicians, there are now
no more persons in the hotel than there were before: the number is just
infinite. But how can this be? The proprietor just added the new guest`s name to
the register and gave him his keys-how can there not be one more person in the
hotel than before? But the situation becomes even stranger. For suppose an
infinity of new guests show up the desk, asking for a room. "Of course, of
course!" says the proprietor, and he proceeds to shift the person in room #1
into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #4, the person in room #3 into
room #6, and so on out to infinity, always putting each former occupant into the
room number twice his own. As a result, all the odd numbered rooms become
vacant, and the infinity of new guests is easily accommodated. And yet, before
they came, all the rooms were full! And again, strangely enough, the number of
guests in the hotel is the same after the infinity of new guests check in as
before, even though there were as many new guests as old guests. In fact, the
proprietor could repeat this process infinitely many times and yet there would
never be one single person more in the hotel than before.
But Hilbert`s Hotel is even stranger than the German
mathematician gave it out to be. For suppose some of the guests start to check
out. Suppose the guest in room #1 departs. Is there not now one less person in
the hotel? Not according to the mathematicians-but just ask the woman who makes
the beds! Suppose the guests in room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . check out. In this
case an infinite number of people have left the hotel, but according to the
mathematicians there are no less people in the hotel-but don`t talk to that
laundry woman! In fact, we could have every other guest check out of the hotel
and repeat this process infinitely many times, and yet there would never be any
less people in the hotel. But suppose instead the persons in room number 4, 5,
6, . . . checked out. At a single stroke the hotel would be virtually emptied,
the guest register reduced to three names, and the infinite converted to
finitude. And yet it would remain true that the same number of guests checked
out this time as when the guests in room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . .
checked
out. Can anyone sincerely believe that such a hotel could
exist in reality? These sorts of absurdities illustrate the impossibility of the
existence of an actually infinite number of things.
That takes us to (2.12). The truth of this premiss seems
fairly obvious. If the universe never began to exist, then prior to the present
event there have existed an actually infinite number of previous events. Hence,
a beginningless series of events in time entails the existence of an actually
infinite number of things, namely, past events.
Given the truth of (2.11) and (2.12), the conclusion (2.13)
logically follows. The series of past events must be finite and have a
beginning. But since the universe is not distinct from the series of events, it
follows that the universe began to exist.
At this point, we might find it profitable to consider
several objections that might be raised against the argument. First let us
consider objections to (2.11). Wallace Matson objects that the premiss must mean
that an actually infinite number of things is logically impossible; but it is
easy to show that such a collection is logically possible. For example, the
series of negative numbers {. . . -3, -2, -1} is an actually infinite collection
with no first member.[10] Matson`s error here lies in thinking that (2.11) means
to assert the logical impossibility of an actually infinite number of things.
What the premiss expresses is the real or factual impossibility of an actual
infinite. To illustrate the difference between real and logical possibility:
there is no logical impossibility in something`s coming to exist without a
cause, but such a circumstance may well be really or metaphysically impossible.
In the same way, (2.11) asserts that the absurdities entailed in the real
existence of an actual infinite show that such an existence is metaphysically
impossible. Hence, one could grant that in the conceptual realm of mathematics
one can, given certain conventions and axioms, speak consistently about infinite
sets of numbers, but this in no way implies that an actually infinite number of
things is really possible. One might also note that the mathematical school of
intuitionism denies that even the number series is actually infinite (they take
it to be potentially infinite only), so that appeal to number series as examples
of actual infinites is a moot procedure.
The late J.L. Mackie also objected to (2.11), claiming that
the absurdities are resolved by noting that for infinite groups the axiom "the
whole is greater than its part" does not hold, as it does for finite groups.[11]
Similarly, Quentin Smith comments that once we understand that an infinite set
has a proper subset which has the same number of members as the set itself, the
purportedly absurd situations become "perfectly believable."[12] But to my mind,
it is precisely this feature of infinite set theory which, when translated into
the realm of the real, yields results which are perfectly incredible, for
example, Hilbert`s Hotel. Moreover, not all the absurdities stem from infinite
set theory`s denial of Euclid`s axiom: the absurdities illustrated by guests
checking out of the hotel stem from the self-contradictory results when the
inverse operations of subtraction or division are performed using transfinite
numbers. Here the case against an actually infinite collection of things becomes
decisive.
Finally one might note the objection of Sorabji, who
maintains that illustrations such as Hilbert`s Hotel involve no absurdity. In
order to understand what is wrong with the kalam argument, he asks us to
envision two parallel columns beginning at the same point and stretching away
into the infinite distance, one the column of past years and the other the
column of past days. The sense in which the column of past days is no larger
than the column of past years, says Sorabji, is that the column of days will not
"stick out" beyond the far end of the other column, since neither column has a
far end. Now in the case of Hilbert`s Hotel there is the temptation to think
that some unfortunate resident at the far end will drop off into space. But
there is no far end: the line of residents will not stick out beyond the far end
of the line of rooms. Once this is seen, the outcome is just an explicable- even
if a surprising and exhilarating- truth about infinity.[13] Now Sorabji is
certainly correct, as we have seen, that Hilbert`s Hotel illustrates an
explicable truth about the nature of the actual infinite. If an actually
infinite number of things could exist, a Hilbert`s Hotel would be possible. But
Sorabji seems to fail to understand the heart of the paradox: I, for one,
experience no temptation to think of people dropping off the far end of the
hotel, for there is none, but I do have difficulty believing that a hotel in
which all the rooms are occupied can accommodate more guests. Of course, the
line of guests will not stick out beyond the line of rooms, but if all of those
infinite rooms already have guests in them, then can moving those guests about
really create empty rooms? Sorabji`s own illustration of the columns of past
years and days I find not a little disquieting: if we divide the columns into
foot-long segments and mark one column as the years and the other as the days,
then one column is as long as the other and yet for every foot-length segment in
the column of years, 365 segments of equal length are found in the column of
days! These paradoxical results can be avoided only if such actually infinite
collections can exist only in the imagination, not in reality. In any case, the
Hilbert`s Hotel illustration is not exhausted by dealing only with the addition
of new guests, for the subtraction of guests results in absurdities even more
intractable. Sorabji`s analysis says nothing to resolve these. Hence, it seems
to me that the objections to premiss (2.11) are less plausible than the premiss
itself.
With regard to (2.12), the most frequent objection is that
the past ought to be regarded as a potential infinite only, not an actual
infinite. This was Aquinas`s position versus Bonaventure, and the contemporary
philosopher Charles Hartshorne seems to side with Thomas on this issue.[14] Such
a position is, however, untenable. The future is potentially infinite, since it
does not exist; but the past is actual in a way the future is not, as evidenced
by the fact that we have traces of the past in the present, but no traces of the
future. Hence, if the series of past events never began to exist, there must
have been an actually infinite number of past events.
The objections to either premiss therefore seem to be less
compelling than the premisses themselves. Together they simply that the universe
began to exist. Hence, I conclude that this argument furnishes good grounds for
accepting the truth of premiss (2) that the universe began to exist.
Second Supporting Argument
The second argument (2.2) for the beginning of the universe
is based on the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive
addition. This argument is distinct from the first in that it does not deny the
possibility of the existence of an actual infinite, but the possibility of its
being formed by successive addition.
Premiss (2.21) is the crucial step in the argument. One
cannot form an actually infinite collection of things by successively adding one
member after another. Since one can always add one more before arriving at
infinity, it is impossible to reach actual infinity. Sometimes this is called
the impossibility of "counting to infinity" or "traversing the infinite." It is
important to understand that this impossibility has nothing to do with the
amount of time available: it belongs to the nature of infinity that it cannot be
so formed.
Now someone might say that while an infinite collection
cannot be formed by beginning at a point and adding members, nevertheless an
infinite collection could be formed by never beginning but ending at a point,
that is to say, ending at a point after having added one member after another
from eternity. But this method seems even more unbelievable than the first
method. If one cannot count to infinity, how can one count down from infinity?
If one cannot traverse the infinite by moving in one direction, how can one
traverse it by simply moving in the opposite direction?
Indeed, the idea of a beginningness series ending in the
present seems to be absurd. To give just one illustration: suppose we meet a man
who claims to have been counting from eternity and is now finishing: . . ., -3,
-2, -1, 0. We could ask, why did he not finish counting yesterday or the day
before or the year before? By then an infinite time had already elapsed, so that
he should already have finished by then. Thus, at no point in the infinite past
could we ever find the man finishing his countdown, for by that point he should
already be done! In fact, no matter how far back into the past we go, we can
never find the man counting at all, for at any point we reach he will have
already finished. But if at no point in the past do we find him counting, this
contradicts the hypothesis that he has been counting from eternity. This
illustrates the fact that the formation of an actual infinite by successive
addition is equally impossible whether one proceeds to or from infinity.
Premiss (2.22) presupposes a dynamical view of time
according to which events are actualized in serial fashion, one after another.
The series of events is not a sort of timelessly subsisting world-line which
appears successively in consciousness. Rather becoming is real and essential to
temporal process. Now this view of time is not without its challengers, but to
consider their objections in this article would take us too far afield.[15] In
this piece, we must rest content with the fact that we are arguing on common
ground with our ordinary intuitions of temporal becoming and in agreement with a
good number of contemporary philosophers of time and space.
Given the truth of (2.21) and (2.22), the conclusion (2.23)
logically follows. If the universe did not begin to exist a finite time ago,
then the present moment could never arrive. But obviously, it has arrived.
Therefore, we know that the universe is finite in the past and began to exist.
Again, it would be profitable to consider various objections
that have been offered against this reasoning. Against (2.21), Mackie bjects
that the argument illicitly assumes an infinitely distant starting point in the
past and then pronounces it impossible to travel from that point to today. But
there would in an infinite past be no starting point, not even an infinitely
distant one. Yet from any given point in the infinite past, there is only a
finite distance to the present.[16] Now it seems to me that Mackie`s allegation
that the argument presupposes an infinitely distant starting point is entirely
groundless. The beginningless character of the series only serves to accentuate
the difficulty of its being formed by successive addition. The fact that there
is no beginning at all, not even an infinitely distant one, makes the problem
more, not less, nettlesome. And the point that from any moment in the infinite
past there is only a finite temporal distance to the present may be dismissed as
irrelevant. The question is not how any finite portion of the temporal series
can be formed, but how the whole infinite series can be formed. If Mackie thinks
that because every segment of the series can be formed by successive addition
therefore the whole series can be so formed, then he is simply committing the
fallacy of composition.
Sorabji similarly objects that the reason it is impossible
to count down from infinity is because counting involves by nature taking a
starting number, which is lacking in this case. But completing an infinite lapse
of years involves no starting year and is, hence, possible.[17] But this
response is clearly inadequate, for, as we have seen, the years of an infinite
past could be enumerated by the negative numbers, in which case a completed
infinity of years would, indeed, entail a beginningless countdown from infinity.
Sorabji anticipates this rebuttal, however, and claims that such a backwards
countdown is possible in principle and therefore no logical barrier has been
exhibited to the elapsing of an infinity of past years. Again, however, the
question I am posing is not whether there is a logical contradiction in such a
notion, but whether such a countdown is not metaphysically absurd. For we have
seen that such a countdown should at any point already have been completed. But
Sorabji is again ready with a response: to say the countdown should at any point
already be over confuses counting an infinity of numbers with counting all the
numbers. At any given point in the past, the eternal counter will have already
counted an infinity of negative numbers, but that does not entail that he will
have counted all the negative numbers. I do not think the argument makes this
alleged equivocation, and this may be made clear by examining the reason why our
eternal counter is supposedly able to complete a count of the negative numbers
ending at zero. In order to justify the possibility of this intuitively
impossible feat, the argument`s opponent appeals to the so- called Principle of
Correspondence used in set theory to determine whether two sets are equivalent
(that is, have the same number of members) by matching the members of one set
with the members of the other set and vice versa. On the basis of this principle
the objector argues that since the counter has lived, say, an infinite number of
years and since the set of past years can be put into a one- to-one
correspondence with the set of negative numbers, it follows that by counting one
number a year an eternal counter would complete a countdown of the negative
numbers by the present year. If we were to ask why the counter would not finish
next year or in a hundred years, the objector would respond that prior to the
present year an infinite number of years will have already elapsed, so that by
the Principle of Correspondence, all the numbers should have been counted by
now. But this reasoning backfires on the objector: for, as we have seen, on this
account the counter should at any point in the past have already finished
counting all the numbers, since a one-to-one correspondence exists between the
years of the past and the negative numbers. Thus, there is no equivocation
between counting an infinity of numbers and counting all the numbers. But at
this point a deeper absurdity bursts in view: for suppose there were another
counter who counted at a rate of one negative number per day. According to the
Principle of Correspondence, which underlies infinite set theory and transfinite
arithmetic, both of our eternal counters will finish their countdowns at the
same moment, even though one is counting at a rate 365 times faster than the
other! Can anyone believe that such scenarios can actually obtain in reality,
but do not rather represent the outcome of an imaginary game being played in a
purely conceptual realm according to adopted logical conventions and axioms?
As for premiss (2.22), many thinkers have objected that we
need not regard the past as a beginningless infinite series with an end in the
present. Popper, for example, admits that the set of all past events is actually
infinite, but holds that the series of past events is potentially infinite. This
may be seen by beginning in the present and numbering the events backwards, thus
forming a potential infinite. Therefore, the problem of an actual infinite`s
being formed by successive addition does not arise.[18] Similarly, Swinburne
muses that it is dubious whether a completed infinite series with no beginning
but an end makes sense, but he proposes to solve the problem by beginning in the
present and regressing into the past, so that the series of past events would
have no end and would therefore not be a completed infinite.[19] This objection,
however, clearly confuses the mental regress of counting with the real progress
of the temporal series of events itself. Numbering the series from the present
backwards only shows that if there are an infinite number of past events, then
we can denumerate an infinite number of past events. But the problem is, how can
this infinite collection of events come to be formed by successive addition? How
we mentally conceive the series does not in any way affect the ontological
character of the series itself as a series with no beginning but an end, or in
other words, as an actual infinite completed by successive addition.
Once again, then, the objections to (2.21) and (2.22) seem
less plausible than the premisses themselves. Together they imply (2.23), or
that the universe began to exist.
First Scientific Confirmation
These purely philosophical arguments for the beginning of
the universe have received remarkable confirmation from discoveries in astronomy
and astrophysics during this century. These confirmations might be summarized
under two heads: the confirmation from the expansion of the universe and the
confirmation from thermodynamic properties of the universe.
With regard to the first, Hubble`s discovery in 1929 of the
red-shift in the light from distant galaxies began a revolution in astronomy
perhaps as significant as the Copernican revolution. Prior to this time the
universe as a whole was conceived to be static; but the startling conclusion to
which Hubble was led was that the red-shift is due to the fact that the universe
is in fact expanding. The staggering implication of this fact is that as one
traces the expansion back in time, the universe becomes denser and denser until
one reaches a point of infinite density from which the universe began to expand.
The upshot of Hubble`s discovery was that at some point in the finite
past-probably around 15 billion years ago-the entire known universe was
contracted down to a single mathematical point which marked the origin of the
universe. That initial explosion has come to be known as the "Big Bang." Four of
the world`s most prominent astronomers described that event in these words:
The universe began from a state of infinite density. . . .
Space and time were created in that event and so was all the matter in the
universe. It is not meaningful to ask what happened before the Big Bang; it is
like asking what is north of the North Pole. Similarly, it is not sensible to
ask where the Big Bang took place. The point-universe was not an object isolated
in space; it was the entire universe, and so the answer can only be that the Big
Bang happened everywhere.[20]
This event that marked the beginning of the universe becomes
all the more amazing when one reflects on the fact that a state of "infinite
density" is synonymous to "nothing." There can be no object that possesses
infinite density, for if it had any size at all it could still be even more
dense. Therefore, as Cambridge astronomer Fred Hoyle points out, the Big Bang
Theory requires the creation of matter from nothing. This is because as one goes
back in time, one reaches a point at which, in Hoyle`s words, the universe was
"shrunk down to nothing at all."[21] Thus, what the Big Bang model of the
universe seems to require is that the universe began to exist and was created
out of nothing.
Some theorists have attempted to avoid the absolute
beginning of the universe implied by the Big Bang theory by speculating that the
universe may undergo an infinite series of expansions and contractions. There
are, however, good grounds for doubting the adequacy of such an oscillating
model of the universe: (i) The oscillating model appears to be physically
impossible. For all the talk about such models, the fact seems to be that they
are only theoretically, but not physically possible. As the late Professor
Tinsley of Yale explains, in oscillating models "even though the mathematics say
that the universe oscillates, there is no known physics to reverse the collapse
and bounce back to a new expansion. The physics seems to say that those models
start from the Big Bang, expand, collapse, then end."[22] In order for the
oscillating model to be correct, it would seem that the known laws of physics
would have to be revised. (ii) The oscillating model seems to be observationally
untenable. Two facts of observational astronomy appear to run contrary to the
oscillating model. First, the observed homogeneity of matter distribution
throughout the universe seems unaccountable on an oscillating model. During the
contraction phase of such a model, black holes begin to gobble up surrounding
matter, resulting in an inhomogeneous distribution of matter. But there is no
known mechanism to "iron out" these inhomogeneities during the ensuing expansion
phase. Thus, the homogeneity of matter observed throughout the universe would
remain unexplained. Second, the density of the universe appears to be
insufficient for the re-contraction of the universe. For the oscillating model
to be even possible, it is necessary that the universe be sufficiently dense
such that gravity can overcome the force of the expansion and pull the universe
back together again. However, according to the best estimates, if one takes into
account both luminous matter and non-luminous matter (found in galactic halos)
as well as any possible contribution of neutrino particles to total mass, the
universe is still only about one-half that needed for re-contraction.[23]
Moreover, recent work on calculating the speed and deceleration of the expansion
confirms that the universe is expanding at, so to speak, "escape velocity" and
will not therefore re-contract. According to Sandage and Tammann, "Hence, we are
forced to decide that . . . it seems inevitable that the Universe will expand
forever"; they conclude, therefore, that "the Universe has happened only
once."[24]
Second Scientific Confirmation
As if this were not enough, there is a second scientific
confirmation of the beginning of the universe based on the thermodynamic
properties of various cosmological models. According to the second law of
thermodynamics, processes taking place in a closed system always tend toward a
state of equilibrium. Now our interest is in what implications this has when the
law is applied to the universe as a whole. For the universe is a gigantic closed
system, since it is everything there is and no energy is being fed into it from
without. The second law seems to imply that, given enough time, the universe
will reach a state of thermodynamic equilibrium, known as the "heat death" of
the universe. This death may be hot or cold, depending on whether the universe
will expand forever or eventually re-contract. On the one hand, if the density
of the universe is great enough to overcome the force of the expansion, then the
universe will re-contract into a hot fireball. As the universe contracts, the
stars burn more rapidly until they finally explode or evaporate. As the universe
grows denser, the black holes begin to gobble up everything around them and
begin themselves to coalesce until all the black holes finally coalesce into one
gigantic black hole which is coextensive with the universe, from which it will
never re-emerge. On the other hand, if the density of the universe is
insufficient to halt the expansion, as seems more likely, then the galaxies will
turn all their gas into stars and the stars will burn out. At 10[30 ]years the
universe will consist of 90% dead stars, 9% supermassive black holes, and l%
atomic matter. Elementary particle physics suggests that thereafter protons will
decay into electrons and positrons, so that space will be filled with a rarefied
gas so thin that the distance between an electron and a positron will be about
the size of the present galaxy. At 10[100] years some scientists believe that
the black holes themselves will dissipate into radiation and elementary
particles. Eventually all the matter in the dark, cold, ever-expanding universe
will be reduced to an ultra-thin gas of elementary particles and radiation.
Equilibrium will prevail throughout, and the entire universe will be in its
final state, from which no change will occur.
Now the question which needs to be asked is this: if, given
sufficient time, the universe will reach heat death, then why is it not now in a
state of heat death if it has existed for infinite time? If the universe did not
begin to exist, then it should now be in a state of equilibrium. Some theorists
have suggested that the universe escapes final heat death by oscillating from
eternity past to eternity future. But we have already seen that such a model
seems to be physically and observationally untenable. But even if we waive those
considerations and suppose that the universe does oscillate, the fact is that
the thermodynamic properties of this model imply the very beginning of the
universe which its proponents seek to avoid. For the thermodynamic properties of
an oscillating model are such that the universe expands farther and farther with
each successive cycle. Therefore, as one traces the expansions back in time,
they grow smaller and smaller. As one scientific team explains, "The effect of
entropy production will be to enlarge the cosmic scale, from cycle to cycle. . .
. Thus, looking back in time, each cycle generated less entropy, had a smaller
cycle time, and had a smaller cycle expansion factor than the cycle that
followed it."[25] Novikov and Zeldovich of the Institute of Applied Mathematics
of the USSR Academy of Sciences therefore conclude, "The multicycle model has an
infinite future, but only a finite past."[26] As another writer points out, the
oscillating model of the universe thus still requires an origin of the universe
prior to the smallest cycle.[27]
So whatever scenario one selects for the future of the
universe, thermodynamics implies that the universe began to exist. According to
physicist P.C.W. Davies, the universe must have been created a finite time ago
and is in the process of winding down. Prior to the creation, the universe
simply did not exist. Therefore, Davies concludes, even though we may not like
it, we must conclude that the universe`s energy was somehow simply "put in" at
the creation as an initial condition.[28]
We therefore have both philosophical argument and scientific
confirmation for the beginning of the universe. On this basis I think that we
are amply justified in concluding the truth of premiss (2) that the universe
began to exist.
First Premiss
Premiss (1) strikes me as relatively non-controversial. It
is based on the metaphysical intuition that something cannot come out of
nothing. Hence, any argument for the principle is apt to be less obvious than
the principle itself. Even the great skeptic David Hume admitted that he never
asserted so absurd a proposition as that something might come into existence
without a cause; he only denied that one could prove the obviously true causal
principle.[29] With regard to the universe, if originally there were absolutely
nothing-no God, no space, no time-, then how could the universe possibly come to
exist? The truth of the principle ex nihilo, nihil fit is so obvious that I
think we are justified in foregoing an elaborate defense of the argument`s first
premiss.
Nevertheless, some thinkers, exercised to avoid the theism
implicit in this premiss within the present context, have felt driven to deny
its truth. In order to avoid its theistic implications, Davies presents a
scenario which, he confesses, "should not be taken too seriously," but which
seems to have a powerful attraction for Davies.[30] He has reference to a
quantum theory of gravity according to which spacetime itself could spring
uncaused into being out of absolutely nothing. While admitting that there is
"still no satisfactory theory of quantum gravity," such a theory "would allow
spacetime to be created and destroyed spontaneously and uncaused in the same way
that particles are created and destroyed spontaneously and uncaused. The theory
would entail a certain mathematically determined probability that, for instance,
a blob of space would appear where none existed before. Thus, spacetime could
pop out of nothingness as the result of a causeless quantum
transition."[31]
Now in fact particle pair production furnishes no analogy
for this radical ex nihilo becoming, as Davies seems to imply. This quantum
phenomenon, even if an exception to the principle that every event has a cause,
provides no analogy to something`s coming into being out of nothing. Though
physicists speak of this as particle pair creation and annihilation, such terms
are philosophically misleading, for all that actually occurs is conversion of
energy into matter or vice versa. As Davies admits, "The processes described
here do not represent the creation of matter out of nothing, but the conversion
of pre- existing energy into material form."[32] Hence, Davies greatly misleads
his reader when he claims that "Particles . . . can appear out of nowhere
without specific causation" and again, "Yet the world of quantum physics
routinely produces something for nothing."[33] On the contrary, the world of
quantum physics never produces something for nothing.
But to consider the case on its own merits: quantum gravity
is so poorly understood that the period prior to 10[-43] sec, which this theory
hopes to describe, has been compared by one wag to the regions on the maps of
the ancient cartographers marked "Here there be dragons": it can easily be
filled with all sorts of fantasies. In fact, there seems to be no good reason to
think that such a theory would involve the sort of spontaneous becoming ex
nihilo which Davies suggests. A quantum theory of gravity has the goal of
providing a theory of gravitation based on the exchange of particles (gravitons)
rather than the geometry of space, which can then be brought into a Grand
Unification Theory that unites all the forces of nature into a supersymmetrical
state in which one fundamental force and a single kind of particle exist. But
there seems to be nothing in this which suggests the possibility of spontaneous
becoming ex nihilo.
Indeed, it is not at all clear that Davies`s account is even
intelligible. What can be meant, for example, by the claim that there is a
mathematical probability that nothingness should spawn a region of spacetime
"where none existed before?" It cannot mean that given enough time a region of
spacetime would pop into existence at a certain place, since neither place nor
time exist apart from spacetime. The notion of some probability of something`s
coming out of nothing thus seems incoherent.
I am reminded in this connection of some remarks made by
A.N. Prior concerning an argument put forward by Jonathan Edwards against
something`s coming into existence uncaused. This would be impossible, said
Edwards, because it would then be inexplicable why just any and everything
cannot or does not come to exist uncaused. One cannot respond that only things
of a certain nature come into existence uncaused, since prior to their existence
they have no nature which could control their coming to be. Prior made a
cosmological application of Edwards`s reasoning by commenting on the steady
state model`s postulating the continuous creation of hydrogen atoms ex nihilo:
It is no part of Hoyle`s theory that this process is
causeless, but I want to be more definite about this, and to say that if it is
causeless, then what is alleged to happen is fantastic and incredible. If it is
possible for objects-objects, now, which really are objects, "substances endowed
with capacities"-to start existing without a cause, then it is incredible that
they should all turn out to be objects of the same sort, namely, hydrogen atoms.
The peculiar nature of hydrogen atoms cannot possibly be what makes such
starting-to-exist possible for them but not for objects of any other sort; for
hydrogen atoms do not have this nature until they are there to have it, i.e.
until their starting-to-exist has already occurred. That is Edwards`s argument,
in fact; and here it does seem entirely cogent. . . .[34]
Now in the case at hand, if originally absolutely nothing
existed, then why should it be spacetime that springs spontaneously out of the
void, rather than, say, hydrogen atoms or even rabbits? How can one talk about
the probability of any particular thing`s popping into being out of nothing?
Davies on one occasion seems to answer as if the laws of
physics are the controlling factor which determines what may leap uncaused into
being: "But what of the laws? They have to be `there` to start with so that the
universe can come into being. Quantum physics has to exist (in some sense) so
that a quantum transition can generate the cosmos in the first place."[35] Now
this seems exceedingly peculiar. Davies seems to attribute to the laws of nature
themselves a sort of ontological and causal status such that they constrain
spontaneous becoming. But this seems clearly wrong-headed: the laws of physics
do not themselves cause or constrain anything; they are simply propositional
descriptions of a certain form and generality of what does happen in the
universe. And the issue Edwards raises is why, if there were absolutely nothing,
it would be true that any one thing rather than another should pop into being
uncaused? It is futile to say it somehow belongs to the nature of spacetime to
do so, for if there were absolutely nothing then there would have been no nature
to determine that spacetime should spring into being.
Even more fundamentally, however, what Davies envisions is
surely metaphysical nonsense. Though his scenario is cast as a scientific
theory,. someone ought to be bold enough to say that the Emperor is wearing no
clothes. Either the necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of
spacetime existed or not; if so, then it is not true that nothing existed; if
not, then it would seem ontologically impossible that being should arise out of
absolute non-being. To call such spontaneous springing into being out of
non-being a "quantum transition" or to attribute it to "quantum gravity"
explains nothing; indeed, on this account, there is no explanation. It just
happens.
It seems to me, therefore, that Davies has not provided any
plausible basis for denying the truth of the cosmological argument`s first
premiss. That whatever begins to exist has a cause would seem to be an
ontologically necessary truth, one which is constantly confirmed in our
experience.
Conclusion
Given the truth of premisses (1) and (2), it logically
follows that (3) the universe has a cause of its existence. In fact, I think
that it can be plausibly argued that the cause of the universe must be a
personal Creator. For how else could a temporal effect arise from an eternal
cause? If the cause were simply a mechanically operating set of necessary and
sufficient conditions existing from eternity, then why would not the effect also
exist from eternity? For example, if the cause of water`s being frozen is the
temperature`s being below zero degrees, then if the temperature were below zero
degrees from eternity, then any water present would be frozen from eternity. The
only way to have an eternal cause but a temporal effect would seem to be if the
cause is a personal agent who freely chooses to create an effect in time. For
example, a man sitting from eternity may will to stand up; hence, a temporal
effect may arise from an eternally existing agent. Indeed, the agent may will
from eternity to create a temporal effect, so that no change in the agent need
be conceived. Thus, we are brought not merely to the first cause of the
universe, but to its personal Creator.
Summary and Conclusion
In conclusion, we have seen on the basis of both
philosophical argument and scientific confirmation that it is plausible that the
universe began to exist. Given the intuitively obvious principle that whatever
begins to exist has a cause of its existence, we have been led to conclude that
the universe has a cause of its existence. On the basis of our argument, this
cause would have to be uncaused, eternal, changeless, timeless, and immaterial.
Moreover, it would have to be a personal agent who freely elects to create an
effect in time. Therefore, on the basis of the kalam cosmological argument, I
conclude that it is rational to believe that God exists.
NOTES
[1]G.W. Leibniz, "The Principles of Nature and of Grace,
Based on Reason," in Leibniz Selections, ed. Philip P. Wiener, The Modern
Student`s Library (New York: Charles Scribner`s Sons, 1951), p. 527.
[2]Aristotle Metaphysica Lambda. l. 982b10-15.
[3]Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (London:
Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 70.
[4]J.J.C. Smart, "The Existence of God," Church Quarterly
Review 156 (1955): 194.
[5]G.W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God,
the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, trans. E.M. Huggard (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 127; cf. idem, "Principles," p. 528.
[6]John Hick, "God as Necessary Being," Journal of
Philosophy 57 (1960): 733-4.
[7]David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, ed.
with an Introduction by Norman Kemp Smith, Library of the Liberal Arts
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1947), p. 190.
[8]Bertrand Russell and F.C. Copleston, "The Existence of
God," in The Existence of God, ed. with an Introduction by John Hick, Problems
of Philosophy Series (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1964), p. 175.
[9]See William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument from
Plato to Leibniz, Library of Philosophy and Religion (London: Macmillan, 1980),
pp. 48-58, 61-76, 98-104, 128-31.
[10]Wallace Matson, The Existence of God (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 58-60.
[11]J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1982), p. 93.
[12]Quentin Smith, "Infinity and the Past," Philosophy of
Science 54 (1987): 69.
[13]Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 213, 222-3.
[14]Charles Hartshorne, Man`s Vision of God and the Logic
of Theism (Chicago: Willett, Clark, & Co., 1941), p. 37.
[15]G.J. Whitrow defends a form of this argument which does
not presuppose a dynamical view of time, by asserting that an infinite past
would still have to be "lived through" by any everlasting, conscious being, even
if the series of physical events subsisted timelessly (G.J. Whitrow, The
Natural Philosophy of Time, 2d ed. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980], pp. 28-32).
[16]Mackie, Theism, p. 93.
[17]Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, pp. 219-22.
[18]K.R. Popper, "On the Possibility of an Infinite Past: a
Reply to Whitrow," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1978):
47-8.
[19]R.G. Swinburne, "The Beginning of the Universe," The
Aristotelian Society 40 (1966): 131-2.
[20]Richard J. Gott, et.al., "Will the Universe Expand
Forever?" Scientific American (March 1976), p. 65.
[21]Fred Hoyle, From Stonehenge to Modern Cosmology (San
Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1972), p. 36.
[22]Beatrice Tinsley, personal letter.
[23]David N. Schramm and Gary Steigman, "Relic Neutrinos
and the Density of the Universe," Astrophysical Journal 243 (1981): p. 1-7.
[24]Alan Sandage and G.A. Tammann, "Steps Toward the Hubble
Constant. VII," Astrophyscial Journal 210 (1976): 23, 7; see also idem, "Steps
toward the Hubble Constant. VIII." Astrophysical Journal 256 (1982): 339-45.
[25]Duane Dicus, et.al. "Effects of Proton Decay on the
Cosmological Future." Astrophysical Journal 252 (1982): l, 8.
[26]I.D. Novikov and Ya. B. Zeldovich, "Physical Processes
Near Cosmological Singularities," Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics 11
(1973): 401-2.
[27]John Gribbin, "Oscillating Universe Bounces Back,"
Nature 259 (1976): 16.
[28]P.C.W. Davies, The Physics of Time Asymmetry (London:
Surrey University Press, 1974), p. 104.
[29]David Hume to John Stewart, February, 1754, in The
Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1932), 1:187.
[30]Paul Davies, God and the New Physics (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1983), p. 214.
[31]Ibid., p. 215.
[32]Ibid., p. 31.
[33]Ibid., pp. 215, 216.
[34]A.N. Prior, "Limited Indeterminism," in Papers on Time
and Tense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 65.
[35]Davies, God, p. 217. Print This Resource See Related
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