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| The Existence of God
The Existence of God
Truth Journal
The Existence of God and the
Beginning of the Universe
William Lane Craig
William Craig earned a doctorate in
philosophy at the University of Birmingham, England, before taking a doctorate
in
theology from the Ludwig Maximiliens
Universitat-Munchen, West Germany, at which latter institution he was for two
years
a Fellow of the Alexander von
Humboldt-Stiftung. He is currently a visiting scholar at the Universite
Catholique de Louvain.
He has authored various books, including
The Kalam Cosmological Argument, The Cosmological Argument from Plato
to
Leibniz, and The Problem of Divine
Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez, as well as
articles in
professional journals like British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, Zeitschrift fur Philosophische
Forschung,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and
Philosophia.
Introduction
"The first question which should rightly
be asked," wrote G.W.F. Leibniz, is "Why is there something rather than
nothing?"[1] This
question does seem to possess a profound
existential force, which has been felt by some of mankind`s greatest thinkers.
According to
Aristotle, philosophy begins with a sense
of wonder about the world, and the most profound question a man can ask concerns
the
origin of the universe.[2] In his
biography of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm reports that Wittgenstein said
that he sometimes
had a certain experience which could best
be described by saying that "when I have it, I wonder at the existence of the
world. I am
then inclined to use such phrases as `How
extraordinary that anything should exist!`"[3] Similarly, one contemporary
philosopher
remarks, ". . . My mind often seems to
reel under the immense significance this question has for me. That anything
exists at all does
seem to me a matter for the deepest
awe."[4]
Why does something exist instead of
nothing? Leibniz answered this question by arguing that something exists rather
than nothing
because a necessary being exists which
carries within itself its reason for existence and is the sufficient reason for
the existence of all
contingent being.[5]
Although Leibniz (followed by certain
contemporary philosophers) regarded the non- existence of a necessary being as
logically
impossible, a more modest explication of
necessity of existence in terms of what he calls "factual necessity" has been
given by John
Hick: a necessary being is an eternal,
uncaused, indestructible, and incorruptible being.[6] Leibniz, of course,
identified the necessary
being as God. His critics, however,
disputed this identification, contending that the material universe could itself
be assigned the status
of a necessary being. "Why," queried David
Hume, "may not the material universe be the necessary existent Being, according
to this
pretended explanation of necessity?"[7]
Typically, this has been precisely the position of the atheist. Atheists have
not felt compelled to
embrace the view that the universe came
into being out of nothing for no reason at all; rather they regard the universe
itself as a sort of
factually necessary being: the universe is
eternal, uncaused, indestructible, and incorruptible. As Russell neatly put it,
" . . . The universe
is just there, and that`s
all."[8]
Does Leibniz`s argument therefore leave us
in a rational impasse, or might there not be some further resources available
for untangling
the riddle of the existence of the world?
It seems to me that there are. It will be remembered that an essential property
of a necessary
being is eternality. If then it could be
made plausible that the universe began to exist and is not therefore eternal,
one would to that
extent at least have shown the superiority
of theism as a rational world view.
Now there is one form of the cosmological
argument, much neglected today but of great historical importance, that aims
precisely at
the demonstration that the universe had a
beginning in time.[9] Originating in the efforts of Christian theologians to
refute the Greek
doctrine of the eternity of matter, this
argument was developed into sophisticated formulations by medieval Islamic and
Jewish
theologians, who in turn passed it back to
the Latin West. The argument thus has a broad inter- sectarian appeal, having
been
defended by Muslims, Jews, and Christians
both Catholic and Protestant.
This argument, which I have called the
kalam cosmological argument, can be exhibited as follows:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause
of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
2.1 Argument based on the
impossibility of an actual infinite.
2.11 An actual infinite
cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal
regress of events is an actual
infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite
temporal regress of events
cannot exist.
2.2 Argument based on the
impossibility of the formation of an
actual infinite by successive
addition.
2.21 A collection formed by
successive addition cannot be
actually infinite.
2.22 The temporal series of
past events is a collection
formed by successive
addition.
2.23 Therefore, the temporal
series of past events cannot
be actually
infinite.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause
of its existence.
Let us examine this argument more closely.
Defense of the Kalam Cosmological Argument
Second Premiss
Clearly, the crucial premiss in this
argument is (2), and two independent arguments are offered in support of it. Let
us therefore turn
first to an examination of the supporting
arguments.
First Supporting Argument
In order to understand (2.1), we need to
understand the difference between a potential infinite and an actual infinite.
Crudely put, a
potential infinite is a collection which
is increasing toward infinity as a limit, but never gets there. Such a
collection is really indefinite,
not infinite. The sign of this sort of
infinity, which is used in calculus, is . An actual infinite is a collection in
which the number of
members really is infinite. The collection
is not growing toward infinity; it is infinite, it is "complete." The sign of
this sort of infinity,
which is used in set theory to designate
sets which have an infinite number of members, such as {1, 2, 3, . . .}, is 0.
Now (2.11)
maintains, not that a potentially infinite
number of things cannot exist, but that an actually infinite number of things
cannot exist. For if an
actually infinite number of things could
exist, this would spawn all sorts of absurdities.
Perhaps the best way to bring home the
truth of (2.11) is by means of an illustration. Let me use one of my favorites,
Hilbert`s Hotel, a
product of the mind of the great German
mathematician, David Hilbert. Let us imagine a hotel with a finite number of
rooms. Suppose,
furthermore, that all the rooms are full.
When a new guest arrives asking for a room, the proprietor apologizes, "Sorry,
all the rooms
are full." But now let us imagine a hotel
with an infinite number of rooms and suppose once more that all the rooms are
full. There is
not a single vacant room throughout the
entire infinite hotel. Now suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room. "But
of course!"
says the proprietor, and he immediately
shifts the person in room #1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #3,
the person in
room #3 into room #4 and so on, out to
infinity. As a result of these room changes, room #1 now becomes vacant and the
new guest
gratefully checks in. But remember, before
he arrived, all the rooms were full! Equally curious, according to the
mathematicians, there
are now no more persons in the hotel than
there were before: the number is just infinite. But how can this be? The
proprietor just
added the new guest`s name to the register
and gave him his keys-how can there not be one more person in the hotel than
before? But
the situation becomes even stranger. For
suppose an infinity of new guests show up the desk, asking for a room. "Of
course, of
course!" says the proprietor, and he
proceeds to shift the person in room #1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into
room #4, the
person in room #3 into room #6, and so on
out to infinity, always putting each former occupant into the room number twice
his own.
As a result, all the odd numbered rooms
become vacant, and the infinity of new guests is easily accommodated. And yet,
before they
came, all the rooms were full! And again,
strangely enough, the number of guests in the hotel is the same after the
infinity of new guests
check in as before, even though there were
as many new guests as old guests. In fact, the proprietor could repeat this
process
infinitely many times and yet there would
never be one single person more in the hotel than before.
But Hilbert`s Hotel is even stranger than
the German mathematician gave it out to be. For suppose some of the guests start
to check
out. Suppose the guest in room #1 departs.
Is there not now one less person in the hotel? Not according to the
mathematicians-but
just ask the woman who makes the beds!
Suppose the guests in room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . check out. In this case an
infinite number
of people have left the hotel, but
according to the mathematicians there are no less people in the hotel-but don`t
talk to that laundry
woman! In fact, we could have every other
guest check out of the hotel and repeat this process infinitely many times, and
yet there
would never be any less people in the
hotel. But suppose instead the persons in room number 4, 5, 6, . . . checked
out. At a single
stroke the hotel would be virtually
emptied, the guest register reduced to three names, and the infinite converted
to finitude. And yet it
would remain true that the same number of
guests checked out this time as when the guests in room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . .
checked
out. Can anyone sincerely believe that
such a hotel could exist in reality? These sorts of absurdities illustrate the
impossibility of the
existence of an actually infinite number
of things.
That takes us to (2.12). The truth of this
premiss seems fairly obvious. If the universe never began to exist, then prior
to the present
event there have existed an actually
infinite number of previous events. Hence, a beginningless series of events in
time entails the
existence of an actually infinite number
of things, namely, past events.
Given the truth of (2.11) and (2.12), the
conclusion (2.13) logically follows. The series of past events must be finite
and have a
beginning. But since the universe is not
distinct from the series of events, it follows that the universe began to exist.
At this point, we might find it profitable
to consider several objections that might be raised against the argument. First
let us consider
objections to (2.11). Wallace Matson
objects that the premiss must mean that an actually infinite number of things is
logically
impossible; but it is easy to show that
such a collection is logically possible. For example, the series of negative
numbers {. . . -3, -2,
-1} is an actually infinite collection
with no first member.[10] Matson`s error here lies in thinking that (2.11) means
to assert the
logical impossibility of an actually
infinite number of things. What the premiss expresses is the real or factual
impossibility of an actual
infinite. To illustrate the difference
between real and logical possibility: there is no logical impossibility in
something`s coming to exist
without a cause, but such a circumstance
may well be really or metaphysically impossible. In the same way, (2.11) asserts
that the
absurdities entailed in the real existence
of an actual infinite show that such an existence is metaphysically impossible.
Hence, one could
grant that in the conceptual realm of
mathematics one can, given certain conventions and axioms, speak consistently
about infinite sets
of numbers, but this in no way implies
that an actually infinite number of things is really possible. One might also
note that the
mathematical school of intuitionism denies
that even the number series is actually infinite (they take it to be potentially
infinite only), so
that appeal to number series as examples
of actual infinites is a moot procedure.
The late J.L. Mackie also objected to
(2.11), claiming that the absurdities are resolved by noting that for infinite
groups the axiom "the
whole is greater than its part" does not
hold, as it does for finite groups.[11] Similarly, Quentin Smith comments that
once we
understand that an infinite set has a
proper subset which has the same number of members as the set itself, the
purportedly absurd
situations become "perfectly
believable."[12] But to my mind, it is precisely this feature of infinite set
theory which, when translated into
the realm of the real, yields results
which are perfectly incredible, for example, Hilbert`s Hotel. Moreover, not all
the absurdities stem
from infinite set theory`s denial of
Euclid`s axiom: the absurdities illustrated by guests checking out of the hotel
stem from the
self-contradictory results when the
inverse operations of subtraction or division are performed using transfinite
numbers. Here the case
against an actually infinite collection of
things becomes decisive.
Finally one might note the objection of
Sorabji, who maintains that illustrations such as Hilbert`s Hotel involve no
absurdity. In order to
understand what is wrong with the kalam
argument, he asks us to envision two parallel columns beginning at the same
point and
stretching away into the infinite
distance, one the column of past years and the other the column of past days.
The sense in which the
column of past days is no larger than the
column of past years, says Sorabji, is that the column of days will not "stick
out" beyond the
far end of the other column, since neither
column has a far end. Now in the case of Hilbert`s Hotel there is the temptation
to think that
some unfortunate resident at the far end
will drop off into space. But there is no far end: the line of residents will
not stick out beyond
the far end of the line of rooms. Once
this is seen, the outcome is just an explicable- even if a surprising and
exhilarating- truth about
infinity.[13] Now Sorabji is certainly
correct, as we have seen, that Hilbert`s Hotel illustrates an explicable truth
about the nature of the
actual infinite. If an actually infinite
number of things could exist, a Hilbert`s Hotel would be possible. But Sorabji
seems to fail to
understand the heart of the paradox: I,
for one, experience no temptation to think of people dropping off the far end of
the hotel, for
there is none, but I do have difficulty
believing that a hotel in which all the rooms are occupied can accommodate more
guests. Of
course, the line of guests will not stick
out beyond the line of rooms, but if all of those infinite rooms already have
guests in them, then
can moving those guests about really
create empty rooms? Sorabji`s own illustration of the columns of past years and
days I find not a
little disquieting: if we divide the
columns into foot-long segments and mark one column as the years and the other
as the days, then
one column is as long as the other and yet
for every foot-length segment in the column of years, 365 segments of equal
length are
found in the column of days! These
paradoxical results can be avoided only if such actually infinite collections
can exist only in the
imagination, not in reality. In any case,
the Hilbert`s Hotel illustration is not exhausted by dealing only with the
addition of new guests,
for the subtraction of guests results in
absurdities even more intractable. Sorabji`s analysis says nothing to resolve
these. Hence, it
seems to me that the objections to premiss
(2.11) are less plausible than the premiss itself.
With regard to (2.12), the most frequent
objection is that the past ought to be regarded as a potential infinite only,
not an actual
infinite. This was Aquinas`s position
versus Bonaventure, and the contemporary philosopher Charles Hartshorne seems to
side with
Thomas on this issue.[14] Such a position
is, however, untenable. The future is potentially infinite, since it does not
exist; but the past is
actual in a way the future is not, as
evidenced by the fact that we have traces of the past in the present, but no
traces of the future.
Hence, if the series of past events never
began to exist, there must have been an actually infinite number of past events.
The objections to either premiss therefore
seem to be less compelling than the premisses themselves. Together they imply
that the
universe began to exist. Hence, I conclude
that this argument furnishes good grounds for accepting the truth of premiss (2)
that the
universe began to exist.
Second Supporting Argument
The second argument (2.2) for the
beginning of the universe is based on the impossibility of forming an actual
infinite by successive
addition. This argument is distinct from
the first in that it does not deny the possibility of the existence of an actual
infinite, but the
possibility of its being formed by
successive addition.
Premiss (2.21) is the crucial step in the
argument. One cannot form an actually infinite collection of things by
successively adding one
member after another. Since one can always
add one more before arriving at infinity, it is impossible to reach actual
infinity. Sometimes
this is called the impossibility of
"counting to infinity" or "traversing the infinite." It is important to
understand that this impossibility has
nothing to do with the amount of time
available: it belongs to the nature of infinity that it cannot be so formed.
Now someone might say that while an
infinite collection cannot be formed by beginning at a point and adding members,
nevertheless
an infinite collection could be formed by
never beginning but ending at a point, that is to say, ending at a point after
having added one
member after another from eternity. But
this method seems even more unbelievable than the first method. If one cannot
count to
infinity, how can one count down from
infinity? If one cannot traverse the infinite by moving in one direction, how
can one traverse it
by simply moving in the opposite
direction?
Indeed, the idea of a beginningness series
ending in the present seems to be absurd. To give just one illustration: suppose
we meet a
man who claims to have been counting from
eternity and is now finishing: . . ., -3, -2, -1, 0. We could ask, why did he
not finish
counting yesterday or the day before or
the year before? By then an infinite time had already elapsed, so that he should
already have
finished by then. Thus, at no point in the
infinite past could we ever find the man finishing his countdown, for by that
point he should
already be done! In fact, no matter how
far back into the past we go, we can never find the man counting at all, for at
any point we
reach he will have already finished. But
if at no point in the past do we find him counting, this contradicts the
hypothesis that he has
been counting from eternity. This
illustrates the fact that the formation of an actual infinite by successive
addition is equally impossible
whether one proceeds to or from infinity.
Premiss (2.22) presupposes a dynamical
view of time according to which events are actualized in serial fashion, one
after another. The
series of events is not a sort of
timelessly subsisting world-line which appears successively in consciousness.
Rather becoming is real
and essential to temporal process. Now
this view of time is not without its challengers, but to consider their
objections in this article
would take us too far afield.[15] In this
piece, we must rest content with the fact that we are arguing on common ground
with our
ordinary intuitions of temporal becoming
and in agreement with a good number of contemporary philosophers of time and
space.
Given the truth of (2.21) and (2.22), the
conclusion (2.23) logically follows. If the universe did not begin to exist a
finite time ago, then
the present moment could never arrive. But
obviously, it has arrived. Therefore, we know that the universe is finite in the
past and
began to exist.
Again, it would be profitable to consider
various objections that have been offered against this reasoning. Against
(2.21), Mackie
objects that the argument illicitly
assumes an infinitely distant starting point in the past and then pronounces it
impossible to travel from
that point to today. But there would in an
infinite past be no starting point, not even an infinitely distant one. Yet from
any given point in
the infinite past, there is only a finite
distance to the present.[16] Now it seems to me that Mackie`s allegation that
the argument
presupposes an infinitely distant starting
point is entirely groundless. The beginningless character of the series only
serves to accentuate
the difficulty of its being formed by
successive addition. The fact that there is no beginning at all, not even an
infinitely distant one,
makes the problem more, not less,
nettlesome. And the point that from any moment in the infinite past there is
only a finite temporal
distance to the present may be dismissed
as irrelevant. The question is not how any finite portion of the temporal series
can be formed,
but how the whole infinite series can be
formed. If Mackie thinks that because every segment of the series can be formed
by
successive addition therefore the whole
series can be so formed, then he is simply committing the fallacy of
composition.
Sorabji similarly objects that the reason
it is impossible to count down from infinity is because counting involves by
nature taking a
starting number, which is lacking in this
case. But completing an infinite lapse of years involves no starting year and
is, hence,
possible.[17] But this response is clearly
inadequate, for, as we have seen, the years of an infinite past could be
enumerated by the
negative numbers, in which case a
completed infinity of years would, indeed, entail a beginningless countdown from
infinity. Sorabji
anticipates this rebuttal, however, and
claims that such a backwards countdown is possible in principle and therefore no
logical barrier
has been exhibited to the elapsing of an
infinity of past years. Again, however, the question I am posing is not whether
there is a logical
contradiction in such a notion, but
whether such a countdown is not metaphysically absurd. For we have seen that
such a countdown
should at any point already have been
completed. But Sorabji is again ready with a response: to say the countdown
should at any
point already be over confuses counting an
infinity of numbers with counting all the numbers. At any given point in the
past, the
eternal counter will have already counted
an infinity of negative numbers, but that does not entail that he will have
counted all the
negative numbers. I do not think the
argument makes this alleged equivocation, and this may be made clear by
examining the reason
why our eternal counter is supposedly able
to complete a count of the negative numbers ending at zero. In order to justify
the
possibility of this intuitively impossible
feat, the argument`s opponent appeals to the so- called Principle of
Correspondence used in set
theory to determine whether two sets are
equivalent (that is, have the same number of members) by matching the members of
one set
with the members of the other set and vice
versa. On the basis of this principle the objector argues that since the counter
has lived,
say, an infinite number of years and since
the set of past years can be put into a one- to-one correspondence with the set
of negative
numbers, it follows that by counting one
number a year an eternal counter would complete a countdown of the negative
numbers by
the present year. If we were to ask why
the counter would not finish next year or in a hundred years, the objector would
respond that
prior to the present year an infinite
number of years will have already elapsed, so that by the Principle of
Correspondence, all the
numbers should have been counted by now.
But this reasoning backfires on the objector: for, as we have seen, on this
account the
counter should at any point in the past
have already finished counting all the numbers, since a one-to-one
correspondence exists
between the years of the past and the
negative numbers. Thus, there is no equivocation between counting an infinity of
numbers and
counting all the numbers. But at this
point a deeper absurdity bursts in view: for suppose there were another counter
who counted at a
rate of one negative number per day.
According to the Principle of Correspondence, which underlies infinite set
theory and transfinite
arithmetic, both of our eternal counters
will finish their countdowns at the same moment, even though one is counting at
a rate 365
times faster than the other! Can anyone
believe that such scenarios can actually obtain in reality, but do not rather
represent the
outcome of an imaginary game being played
in a purely conceptual realm according to adopted logical conventions and
axioms?
As for premiss (2.22), many thinkers have
objected that we need not regard the past as a beginningless infinite series
with an end in
the present. Popper, for example, admits
that the set of all past events is actually infinite, but holds that the series
of past events is
potentially infinite. This may be seen by
beginning in the present and numbering the events backwards, thus forming a
potential infinite.
Therefore, the problem of an actual
infinite`s being formed by successive addition does not arise.[18] Similarly,
Swinburne muses that
it is dubious whether a completed infinite
series with no beginning but an end makes sense, but he proposes to solve the
problem by
beginning in the present and regressing
into the past, so that the series of past events would have no end and would
therefore not be a
completed infinite.[19] This objection,
however, clearly confuses the mental regress of counting with the real progress
of the
temporal series of events itself.
Numbering the series from the present backwards only shows that if there are an
infinite number of
past events, then we can denumerate an
infinite number of past events. But the problem is, how can this infinite
collection of events
come to be formed by successive addition?
How we mentally conceive the series does not in any way affect the ontological
character
of the series itself as a series with no
beginning but an end, or in other words, as an actual infinite completed by
successive addition.
Once again, then, the objections to (2.21)
and (2.22) seem less plausible than the premisses themselves. Together they
imply (2.23),
or that the universe began to exist.
First Scientific Confirmation
These purely philosophical arguments for
the beginning of the universe have received remarkable confirmation from
discoveries in
astronomy and astrophysics during this
century. These confirmations might be summarized under two heads: the
confirmation from the
expansion of the universe and the
confirmation from thermodynamic properties of the universe.
With regard to the first, Hubble`s
discovery in 1929 of the red-shift in the light from distant galaxies began a
revolution in astronomy
perhaps as significant as the Copernican
revolution. Prior to this time the universe as a whole was conceived to be
static; but the
startling conclusion to which Hubble was
led was that the red-shift is due to the fact that the universe is in fact
expanding. The
staggering implication of this fact is
that as one traces the expansion back in time, the universe becomes denser and
denser until one
reaches a point of infinite density from
which the universe began to expand. The upshot of Hubble`s discovery was that at
some point
in the finite past-probably around 15
billion years ago-the entire known universe was contracted down to a single
mathematical point
which marked the origin of the universe.
That initial explosion has come to be known as the "Big Bang." Four of the
world`s most
prominent astronomers described that event
in these words:
The universe began from a state of
infinite density. . . . Space and time were created in that event and so was all
the
matter in the universe. It is not
meaningful to ask what happened before the Big Bang; it is like asking what is
north of the
North Pole. Similarly, it is not
sensible to ask where the Big Bang took place. The point-universe was not an
object
isolated in space; it was the entire
universe, and so the answer can only be that the Big Bang happened
everywhere.[20]
This event that marked the beginning of
the universe becomes all the more amazing when one reflects on the fact that a
state of "infinite
density" is synonymous to "nothing." There
can be no object that possesses infinite density, for if it had any size at all
it could still be
even more dense. Therefore, as Cambridge
astronomer Fred Hoyle points out, the Big Bang Theory requires the creation of
matter
from nothing. This is because as one goes
back in time, one reaches a point at which, in Hoyle`s words, the universe was
"shrunk
down to nothing at all."[21] Thus, what
the Big Bang model of the universe seems to require is that the universe began
to exist and was
created out of nothing.
Some theorists have attempted to avoid the
absolute beginning of the universe implied by the Big Bang theory by speculating
that the
universe may undergo an infinite series of
expansions and contractions. There are, however, good grounds for doubting the
adequacy
of such an oscillating model of the
universe: (i) The oscillating model appears to be physically impossible. For all
the talk about such
models, the fact seems to be that they are
only theoretically, but not physically possible. As the late Professor Tinsley
of Yale explains,
in oscillating models "even though the
mathematics say that the universe oscillates, there is no known physics to
reverse the collapse
and bounce back to a new expansion. The
physics seems to say that those models start from the Big Bang, expand,
collapse, then
end."[22] In order for the oscillating
model to be correct, it would seem that the known laws of physics would have to
be revised. (ii)
The oscillating model seems to be
observationally untenable. Two facts of observational astronomy appear to run
contrary to the
oscillating model. First, the observed
homogeneity of matter distribution throughout the universe seems unaccountable
on an oscillating
model. During the contraction phase of
such a model, black holes begin to gobble up surrounding matter, resulting in
an
inhomogeneous distribution of matter. But
there is no known mechanism to "iron out" these inhomogeneities during the
ensuing
expansion phase. Thus, the homogeneity of
matter observed throughout the universe would remain unexplained. Second, the
density of
the universe appears to be insufficient
for the re-contraction of the universe. For the oscillating model to be even
possible, it is
necessary that the universe be
sufficiently dense such that gravity can overcome the force of the expansion and
pull the universe back
together again. However, according to the
best estimates, if one takes into account both luminous matter and non-luminous
matter
(found in galactic halos) as well as any
possible contribution of neutrino particles to total mass, the universe is still
only about one-half
that needed for re-contraction.[23]
Moreover, recent work on calculating the speed and deceleration of the expansion
confirms that
the universe is expanding at, so to speak,
"escape velocity" and will not therefore re-contract. According to Sandage and
Tammann,
"Hence, we are forced to decide that . . .
it seems inevitable that the Universe will expand forever"; they conclude,
therefore, that "the
Universe has happened only
once."[24]
Second Scientific Confirmation
As if this were not enough, there is a
second scientific confirmation of the beginning of the universe based on the
thermodynamic
properties of various cosmological models.
According to the second law of thermodynamics, processes taking place in a
closed
system always tend toward a state of
equilibrium. Now our interest is in what implications this has when the law is
applied to the
universe as a whole. For the universe is a
gigantic closed system, since it is everything there is and no energy is being
fed into it from
without. The second law seems to imply
that, given enough time, the universe will reach a state of thermodynamic
equilibrium, known
as the "heat death" of the universe. This
death may be hot or cold, depending on whether the universe will expand forever
or eventually
re-contract. On the one hand, if the
density of the universe is great enough to overcome the force of the expansion,
then the universe
will re-contract into a hot fireball. As
the universe contracts, the stars burn more rapidly until they finally explode
or evaporate. As the
universe grows denser, the black holes
begin to gobble up everything around them and begin themselves to coalesce until
all the black
holes finally coalesce into one gigantic
black hole which is coextensive with the universe, from which it will never
re-emerge. On the
other hand, if the density of the universe
is insufficient to halt the expansion, as seems more likely, then the galaxies
will turn all their gas
into stars and the stars will burn out. At
10[30 ]years the universe will consist of 90% dead stars, 9% supermassive black
holes, and
l% atomic matter. Elementary particle
physics suggests that thereafter protons will decay into electrons and
positrons, so that space
will be filled with a rarefied gas so thin
that the distance between an electron and a positron will be about the size of
the present galaxy.
At 10[100] years some scientists believe
that the black holes themselves will dissipate into radiation and elementary
particles.
Eventually all the matter in the dark,
cold, ever-expanding universe will be reduced to an ultra-thin gas of elementary
particles and
radiation. Equilibrium will prevail
throughout, and the entire universe will be in its final state, from which no
change will occur.
Now the question which needs to be asked
is this: if, given sufficient time, the universe will reach heat death, then why
is it not now in a
state of heat death if it has existed for
infinite time? If the universe did not begin to exist, then it should now be in
a state of equilibrium.
Some theorists have suggested that the
universe escapes final heat death by oscillating from eternity past to eternity
future. But we
have already seen that such a model seems
to be physically and observationally untenable. But even if we waive those
considerations
and suppose that the universe does
oscillate, the fact is that the thermodynamic properties of this model imply the
very beginning of the
universe which its proponents seek to
avoid. For the thermodynamic properties of an oscillating model are such that
the universe
expands farther and farther with each
successive cycle. Therefore, as one traces the expansions back in time, they
grow smaller and
smaller. As one scientific team explains,
"The effect of entropy production will be to enlarge the cosmic scale, from
cycle to cycle. . . .
Thus, looking back in time, each cycle
generated less entropy, had a smaller cycle time, and had a smaller cycle
expansion factor than
the cycle that followed it."[25] Novikov
and Zeldovich of the Institute of Applied Mathematics of the USSR Academy of
Sciences
therefore conclude, "The multicycle model
has an infinite future, but only a finite past."[26] As another writer points
out, the oscillating
model of the universe thus still requires
an origin of the universe prior to the smallest cycle.[27]
So whatever scenario one selects for the
future of the universe, thermodynamics implies that the universe began to exist.
According to
physicist P.C.W. Davies, the universe must
have been created a finite time ago and is in the process of winding down. Prior
to the
creation, the universe simply did not
exist. Therefore, Davies concludes, even though we may not like it, we must
conclude that the
universe`s energy was somehow simply "put
in" at the creation as an initial condition.[28]
We therefore have both philosophical
argument and scientific confirmation for the beginning of the universe. On this
basis I think that
we are amply justified in concluding the
truth of premiss (2) that the universe began to exist.
First Premiss
Premiss (1) strikes me as relatively
non-controversial. It is based on the metaphysical intuition that something
cannot come out of
nothing. Hence, any argument for the
principle is apt to be less obvious than the principle itself. Even the great
skeptic David Hume
admitted that he never asserted so absurd
a proposition as that something might come into existence without a cause; he
only denied
that one could prove the obviously true
causal principle.[29] With regard to the universe, if originally there were
absolutely
nothing-no God, no space, no time-, then
how could the universe possibly come to exist? The truth of the principle ex
nihilo, nihil fit
is so obvious that I think we are
justified in foregoing an elaborate defense of the argument`s first premiss.
Nevertheless, some thinkers, exercised to
avoid the theism implicit in this premiss within the present context, have felt
driven to deny
its truth. In order to avoid its theistic
implications, Davies presents a scenario which, he confesses, "should not be
taken too seriously,"
but which seems to have a powerful
attraction for Davies.[30] He has reference to a quantum theory of gravity
according to which
spacetime itself could spring uncaused
into being out of absolutely nothing. While admitting that there is "still no
satisfactory theory of
quantum gravity," such a theory "would
allow spacetime to be created and destroyed spontaneously and uncaused in the
same way
that particles are created and destroyed
spontaneously and uncaused. The theory would entail a certain mathematically
determined
probability that, for instance, a blob of
space would appear where none existed before. Thus, spacetime could pop out of
nothingness
as the result of a causeless quantum
transition."[31]
Now in fact particle pair production
furnishes no analogy for this radical ex nihilo becoming, as Davies seems to
imply. This quantum
phenomenon, even if an exception to the
principle that every event has a cause, provides no analogy to something`s
coming into being
out of nothing. Though physicists speak of
this as particle pair creation and annihilation, such terms are philosophically
misleading, for
all that actually occurs is conversion of
energy into matter or vice versa. As Davies admits, "The processes described
here do not
represent the creation of matter out of
nothing, but the conversion of pre- existing energy into material form."[32]
Hence, Davies
greatly misleads his reader when he claims
that "Particles . . . can appear out of nowhere without specific causation" and
again, "Yet
the world of quantum physics routinely
produces something for nothing."[33] On the contrary, the world of quantum
physics never
produces something for nothing.
But to consider the case on its own
merits: quantum gravity is so poorly understood that the period prior to 10[-43]
sec, which this
theory hopes to describe, has been
compared by one wag to the regions on the maps of the ancient cartographers
marked "Here there
be dragons": it can easily be filled with
all sorts of fantasies. In fact, there seems to be no good reason to think that
such a theory
would involve the sort of spontaneous
becoming ex nihilo which Davies suggests. A quantum theory of gravity has the
goal of
providing a theory of gravitation based on
the exchange of particles (gravitons) rather than the geometry of space, which
can then be
brought into a Grand Unification Theory
that unites all the forces of nature into a supersymmetrical state in which one
fundamental
force and a single kind of particle exist.
But there seems to be nothing in this which suggests the possibility of
spontaneous becoming
ex nihilo.
Indeed, it is not at all clear that
Davies`s account is even intelligible. What can be meant, for example, by the
claim that there is a
mathematical probability that nothingness
should spawn a region of spacetime "where none existed before?" It cannot mean
that given
enough time a region of spacetime would
pop into existence at a certain place, since neither place nor time exist apart
from spacetime.
The notion of some probability of
something`s coming out of nothing thus seems incoherent.
I am reminded in this connection of some
remarks made by A.N. Prior concerning an argument put forward by Jonathan
Edwards
against something`s coming into existence
uncaused. This would be impossible, said Edwards, because it would then be
inexplicable
why just any and everything cannot or does
not come to exist uncaused. One cannot respond that only things of a certain
nature come
into existence uncaused, since prior to
their existence they have no nature which could control their coming to be.
Prior made a
cosmological application of Edwards`s
reasoning by commenting on the steady state model`s postulating the continuous
creation of
hydrogen atoms ex nihilo:
It is no part of Hoyle`s theory that
this process is causeless, but I want to be more definite about this, and to say
that if it
is causeless, then what is alleged to
happen is fantastic and incredible. If it is possible for objects-objects, now,
which
really are objects, "substances
endowed with capacities"-to start existing without a cause, then it is
incredible that they
should all turn out to be objects of
the same sort, namely, hydrogen atoms. The peculiar nature of hydrogen
atoms
cannot possibly be what makes such
starting-to-exist possible for them but not for objects of any other sort;
for
hydrogen atoms do not have this
nature until they are there to have it, i.e. until their starting-to-exist has
already occurred.
That is Edwards`s argument, in fact;
and here it does seem entirely cogent. . . .[34]
Now in the case at hand, if originally
absolutely nothing existed, then why should it be spacetime that springs
spontaneously out of the
void, rather than, say, hydrogen atoms or
even rabbits? How can one talk about the probability of any particular thing`s
popping into
being out of nothing?
Davies on one occasion seems to answer as
if the laws of physics are the controlling factor which determines what may leap
uncaused
into being: "But what of the laws? They
have to be `there` to start with so that the universe can come into being.
Quantum physics has
to exist (in some sense) so that a quantum
transition can generate the cosmos in the first place."[35] Now this seems
exceedingly
peculiar. Davies seems to attribute to the
laws of nature themselves a sort of ontological and causal status such that they
constrain
spontaneous becoming. But this seems
clearly wrong-headed: the laws of physics do not themselves cause or constrain
anything; they
are simply propositional descriptions of a
certain form and generality of what does happen in the universe. And the issue
Edwards
raises is why, if there were absolutely
nothing, it would be true that any one thing rather than another should pop into
being uncaused?
It is futile to say it somehow belongs to
the nature of spacetime to do so, for if there were absolutely nothing then
there would have
been no nature to determine that spacetime
should spring into being.
Even more fundamentally, however, what
Davies envisions is surely metaphysical nonsense. Though his scenario is cast as
a scientific
theory,. someone ought to be bold enough
to say that the Emperor is wearing no clothes. Either the necessary and
sufficient conditions
for the appearance of spacetime existed or
not; if so, then it is not true that nothing existed; if not, then it would seem
ontologically
impossible that being should arise out of
absolute non-being. To call such spontaneous springing into being out of
non-being a
"quantum transition" or to attribute it to
"quantum gravity" explains nothing; indeed, on this account, there is no
explanation. It just
happens.
It seems to me, therefore, that Davies has
not provided any plausible basis for denying the truth of the cosmological
argument`s first
premiss. That whatever begins to exist has
a cause would seem to be an ontologically necessary truth, one which is
constantly
confirmed in our experience.
Conclusion
Given the truth of premisses (1) and (2),
it logically follows that (3) the universe has a cause of its existence. In
fact, I think that it can
be plausibly argued that the cause of the
universe must be a personal Creator. For how else could a temporal effect arise
from an
eternal cause? If the cause were simply a
mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions existing from
eternity, then
why would not the effect also exist from
eternity? For example, if the cause of water`s being frozen is the temperature`s
being below
zero degrees, then if the temperature were
below zero degrees from eternity, then any water present would be frozen from
eternity.
The only way to have an eternal cause but
a temporal effect would seem to be if the cause is a personal agent who freely
chooses to
create an effect in time. For example, a
man sitting from eternity may will to stand up; hence, a temporal effect may
arise from an
eternally existing agent. Indeed, the
agent may will from eternity to create a temporal effect, so that no change in
the agent need be
conceived. Thus, we are brought not merely
to the first cause of the universe, but to its personal Creator.
Summary and Conclusion
In conclusion, we have seen on the basis
of both philosophical argument and scientific confirmation that it is plausible
that the universe
began to exist. Given the intuitively
obvious principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence, we
have been led to
conclude that the universe has a cause of
its existence. On the basis of our argument, this cause would have to be
uncaused, eternal,
changeless, timeless, and immaterial.
Moreover, it would have to be a personal agent who freely elects to create an
effect in time.
Therefore, on the basis of the kalam
cosmological argument, I conclude that it is rational to believe that God
exists.
NOTES
[1]G.W. Leibniz, "The Principles of Nature
and of Grace, Based on Reason," in Leibniz Selections, ed. Philip P. Wiener,
The
Modern Student`s Library (New York:
Charles Scribner`s Sons, 1951), p. 527.
[2]Aristotle Metaphysica Lambda. l.
982b10-15.
[3]Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A
Memoir (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 70.
[4]J.J.C. Smart, "The Existence of God,"
Church Quarterly Review 156 (1955): 194.
[5]G.W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the
Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, trans. E.M.
Huggard
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1951), p. 127; cf. idem, "Principles," p. 528.
[6]John Hick, "God as Necessary Being,"
Journal of Philosophy 57 (1960): 733-4.
[7]David Hume, Dialogues concerning
Natural Religion, ed. with an Introduction by Norman Kemp Smith, Library of the
Liberal
Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1947),
p. 190.
[8]Bertrand Russell and F.C. Copleston,
"The Existence of God," in The Existence of God, ed. with an Introduction by
John Hick,
Problems of Philosophy Series (New York:
Macmillan & Co., 1964), p. 175.
[9]See William Lane Craig, The
Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz, Library of Philosophy and Religion
(London:
Macmillan, 1980), pp. 48-58, 61-76,
98-104, 128-31.
[10]Wallace Matson, The Existence of God
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 58-60.
[11]J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 93.
[12]Quentin Smith, "Infinity and the
Past," Philosophy of Science 54 (1987): 69.
[13]Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and
the Continuum (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 213, 222-3.
[14]Charles Hartshorne, Man`s Vision of
God and the Logic of Theism (Chicago: Willett, Clark, & Co., 1941), p. 37.
[15]G.J. Whitrow defends a form of this
argument which does not presuppose a dynamical view of time, by asserting that
an infinite
past would still have to be "lived
through" by any everlasting, conscious being, even if the series of physical
events subsisted timelessly
(G.J. Whitrow, The Natural Philosophy of
Time, 2d ed. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980], pp. 28-32).
[16]Mackie, Theism, p. 93.
[17]Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the
Continuum, pp. 219-22.
[18]K.R. Popper, "On the Possibility of an
Infinite Past: a Reply to Whitrow," British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 29
(1978): 47-8.
[19]R.G. Swinburne, "The Beginning of the
Universe," The Aristotelian Society 40 (1966): 131-2.
[20]Richard J. Gott, et.al., "Will the
Universe Expand Forever?" Scientific American (March 1976), p. 65.
[21]Fred Hoyle, From Stonehenge to Modern
Cosmology (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1972), p. 36.
[22]Beatrice Tinsley, personal letter.
[23]David N. Schramm and Gary Steigman,
"Relic Neutrinos and the Density of the Universe," Astrophysical Journal 243
(1981):
p. 1-7.
[24]Alan Sandage and G.A. Tammann, "Steps
Toward the Hubble Constant. VII," Astrophyscial Journal 210 (1976): 23, 7;
see
also idem, "Steps toward the Hubble
Constant. VIII." Astrophysical Journal 256 (1982): 339-45.
[25]Duane Dicus, et.al. "Effects of Proton
Decay on the Cosmological Future." Astrophysical Journal 252 (1982): l, 8.
[26]I.D. Novikov and Ya. B. Zeldovich,
"Physical Processes Near Cosmological Singularities," Annual Review of Astronomy
and
Astrophysics 11 (1973): 401-2.
[27]John Gribbin, "Oscillating Universe
Bounces Back," Nature 259 (1976): 16.
[28]P.C.W. Davies, The Physics of Time
Asymmetry (London: Surrey University Press, 1974), p. 104.
[29]David Hume to John Stewart, February,
1754, in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon
Press,
1932), 1:187.
[30]Paul Davies, God and the New Physics
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 214.
[31]Ibid., p. 215.
[32]Ibid., p. 31.
[33]Ibid., pp. 215, 216.
[34]A.N. Prior, "Limited Indeterminism,"
in Papers on Time and Tense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 65.
[35]Davies, God, p. 217.
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